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ABSTRACT
 This paper presents a method for analysing an aspect 
of interaction that can help us understand how users can 
feel that they are part of a work. I argue that interaction 
can be a form of depiction, causing the user to imagine 
both her perceptual actions and her manipulation of 
the work as being fictional as well as actual. This 
produces an ontological fusion between the actual 
and the fictional. In brief analyses of three interactive 
works, I suggest how this framework can enable a better 
understanding of some aspects of interactive art and 
literature.
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INTRODUCTION
When we engage with an interactive narrative, a hoax 
web site, a computer game or a digital installation art 
work, we do something more than we usually do when 
we watch a movie or read a book or look at pictures 
in an art gallery. All representational art, including 
digital art, requires perception and some degree of 
interpretation from its users, but the kinds of works 
listed above require more than this: they require what 
is usually called interaction. Interaction is a term that 
is often used fairly vaguely, so let me be more specific 
here: I’m interested in how users must perform physical 
actions beyond perceptual actions (such as looking and 
listening) in order to access digital works. These actions 
may be no more arduous than clicking a mouse, or they 
may include walking around a space in a particular way, 
pulling a plastic trigger, jumping on a dance mat and so 
on. 
There have been many different analyses of interactivity 
[19]. Some writers reject the term interaction as too 
vague and too often misused [4]. Yet the basic concept 
is the same whether one chooses to call it interaction or 
not: there is a feedback loop between user and machine 
where the user has some influence on the machine and 
the machine has some influence on the user. Some 
formal definitions distinguish between two or more 
kinds of interactivity based on the exact nature of the 
user’s possible actions [3, 17]. Other definitions focus 
instead on whether or not the user is or feels part of 
the work [21], or experiences immersion [25, 28] and 
agency [25]. The formal definitions and the second 
kind, which can be called ontological, have also been 
combined in a single model [27].
To me, all these analyses of what actually happens when 
a user encounters an interactive work point to this: the 
user performs. Jay David Bolter pointed this out as early 
as 1991, and reiterated it in the second edition of Writing 
Space [9]: “The reader performs the text, perhaps only 
for herself, perhaps for another reader, who may then 
choose to perform the first reader’s text for others” 
(173). Bolter compares this performance  to that of 
actors or musicians, who are bound to the possibilities 
of their instruments or scripts as we are bound to what 
our computers and software will allow us to do. But 
musicians and actors perform for an audience,  and most 
interactive works do not require an audience. They only 
require users.
I think that it is the performance inherent in interaction 
that  makes us feel part of the work. This paper, then, 
is an exploration of the second understanding of 
interactivity: interaction not as a formal quality of a 
work but as a perceived inclusion in the work. The way 
in which the user performs is the theme of this paper.
The performance that occurs in accessing digital works 
has been discussed in terms of speech act theory and 
linguistic performatives, notably by Adrian Miles [23], 
who theorises links as performatives, and by Ragnhild 
Tronstad [31], who has analysed quests in games 
as performatives. Tronstad’s analysis has later been 
extended by Espen Aarseth [2]. Alternatively, interactive 
art has been compared to performance arts [30]. Several 
other perspectives might be chosen to understand how 
the user feels part of the work. For instance, one could 
use phenomenology to try to understand the feeling 
of participation and co-creation. One might scour 
the writings of those theorists who have written on 
interactivity to find patterns and explanations. Or one 
could conduct empirical studies and interview users to 
analyse their actual experiences.
I have chosen a different angle in this paper: I will look 
at what Thomas Pavel describes as the ontological 
fusion between our actual selves and our fictional selves 
when we engage with a fictional work [26] and at 
Kendall Walton’s theorisation of how we use fictional 
representations in our own games of make-believe [35]. 
I will discuss these theories in relation to interactive 
works and present brief applications of this to particular 
works: the digital installation Bino & Cool’s Masterclass 
[7], Michael Joyce’s hypertext fiction afternoon, a story 
[16] and the text adventure game Zork I [8].
Though literary theory has often been used to understand 
digital art and fiction, the theories of fiction and fictional 
worlds I draw upon appear to be largely unknown both 
to mainstream literary criticism and among critics of 
digital arts and culture. Marie-Laure Ryan’s work is 
a clear exception, and it is her work that drew these 
perspectives to my attention [28, 29]. Because Pavel and 
Walton’s ways of thinking about fiction and fictional 
worlds are not well known I will devote the first section 
of the paper to summarising and integrating the elements 
of Pavel’s and Walton’s theories that I find useful in 
understanding interaction. Before that, let me explain the 
notion of fiction I am using.
WHAT IS FICTION?
Sometimes, when I’m sweating away at the gym, I 
imagine that I’m an Olympic weight lifter. The crowd 
is cheering me on, Mum and Dad are close to the 
podium holding banners with “You’re brilliant, Jillikin!” 
emblazoned on them in huge letters, and if I can just lift 
those gigantic weights above my head I’ll win the gold 
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medal I’ve been working towards for a decade. Actually, 
of course, I’m pulling handles fastened to pulleys and 
weights on a contraption that looks nothing like a 
dumbbell, and 5 kilos is a significant load for me. Just as 
all of us do every single day, I am imagining a situation 
that isn’t real.
Though my daydream was prompted by my being in a 
gym, my imaginings were not prescribed by the gym 
or the apparatuses. I could have imagined completely 
otherwise (that I was skiing or lying on the beach in 
the sun), or not imagined anything at all. Indeed, my 
daydream may have been prompted as much by things 
internal to myself as to the machines around me. The 
process of completing a PhD makes daydreams of lifting 
impossible weights come easily.
Let’s leave the weight apparatuses in the gym and move 
over to the rowing machines, or as they’re often called, 
the rowing simulators. While the contraptions in the gym 
are non-figurative devices simply designed to exercise 
particular muscles, a rowing simulator models an actual 
boat. You sit in it, grip the “oars” with your hands, and 
row. Of course, the simulator doesn’t move as an actual 
boat would, and there is no water other than in your 
drink bottle. Some rowing machines (and these are the 
ones I like best) have computers attached to them, too. 
The computer tracks your movements, interprets them 
according to the system it is modelling and represents 
the results continuously in a screen in front of you. As 
you row you see your representation on the screen move 
down the pixelated river. Each time you move your oars, 
your avatar makes the same move. You can even race the 
computer or the person in the simulator beside you.
Sitting in this machine, moving levers as I would move 
oars in an actual boat, and watching an avatar on the 
screen move as I move, I imagine myself rowing a boat 
on a river. It would be almost impossible to imagine 
myself being an Olympic weight lifter about to win gold 
while in the rowing simulator. Perhaps you could do it, if 
you really tried, but it would be a very conscious effort 
and you would know that you were breaking the rules. 
You are intended to imagine that you are rowing a boat, 
perhaps in a race. In Walton’s terms, the rowing machine 
generates fiction and fictional truths:
A fictional truth consists in there being a 
prescription or mandate in some context to 
imagine something. Fictional propositions are 
propositions that are to be imagined – whether or 
not they are in fact imagined. [35]
Fiction, as Kendall Walton defines it, and as I will 
be using the concept, comes from the combination 
of imagination and rules. My daydream of being an 
Olympic weight-lifter had plenty of imagination, but it 
wasn’t governed by any rules, and was not dependent 
on my interaction with the gym equipment. The rowing 
simulator, on the other hand, clearly sets up rules: These 
levers are to be imagined to be oars. You are to imagine 
yourself rowing a boat. It is fictional that I am rowing a 
boat when I use the rowing simulator.
The rowing simulator is not itself a fiction. In fact, I 
won’t be using the term fiction as a noun that refers to 
a work or genre at all. The rowing machine generates 
fiction. Fiction in this view is more a process or an event 
than an object.
Interactive works of art tend to have a lot in common 
with the rowing simulator. The user must perform 
actions in order to activate the work. Certain actions are 
permitted and fairly specific imaginings are mandated. 
According to Walton’s theory (though he never 
mentions interactive works himself), these are attributes 
interactive works would share with all representational 
art, including images, cinema and literature. 
FICTION, REPRESENTATION AND SIMULATION
Walton developed his theory of fictionality through a 
series of essays in the seventies and eighties, and in 1990 
he published a cohesive presentation in a book titled 
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the 
Representative Arts. Our use of representational works is 
central to Walton: the user pretends,  and the work of art 
is a prop in this pretence. 
Walton builds his understanding of our relationship with 
representational works on an analysis of the way we 
play games of make-believe as children. A doll is a prop 
in a child’s game of make-believe. The doll prescribes 
certain imaginings. Fictionally, the child is a parent, 
giving her baby a bath or putting her to bed. Walton 
argues that representational works of art like novels, 
paintings and even some music are props that we use in 
similar games of make-believe. It is worth noting that 
Walton’s (and hence my) use of the word games is here 
broader than that common in game studies, being closer 
to play than to a formal rule-based game.
The rowing simulator is not a representational work 
of art, but it is a simulation, and simulations are a 
special kind of representation. Gonzalo Frasca defines a 
simulation thus:
Simulation is [the] act of modeling a system A by 
a less complex system B, which retains some of 
A’s original behavior. [14]
While literature can describe a boat and describe the 
feeling of rowing, and images can show what a boat 
and rower look like, a simulation models the behaviour 
of rowing: the machine is built and programmed so 
that a tug at the oars will produce the same sensation 
of resistance as is produced by actual oars in actual 
water. In a way, representations are one-dimensional 
simulations. A painting of a boat models one aspect of an 
actual boat, namely the way it looks to an observer. 
The rowing simulator may also be a game. When you 
race against the computer or against an opponent beside 
you, the rowing simulator is like any other racing game. 
If you’ve bought the right accessories for your game 
console you can play car racing games where you 
control the car with a plastic foot pedal and steering 
wheel. Similarly, the rowing simulator provides you with 
levers that behave more or less like oars and a seat that 
slides back and forwards as in a real single scull. There 
are clear rules, and a situation where you either win or 
lose.
Dolls can also be said to be simple simulations. A baby 
doll looks like the object it represents, as a drawing 
does, but a baby doll also models certain behaviours 
of an actual baby. Some dolls cry, shut their eyes when 
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they’re held horizontally, wet their nappies when 
fed a bottle of water or laugh when you tickle them. 
Even rag dolls can be cuddled, put to bed or dressed. 
Obviously not all aspects of a real baby are simulated, 
and the simulation is often approximate or imperfect, 
but it is still a simulation. A theory of fictionality and 
representation that bases itself on simulation rather than 
on the aesthetics of narrative or visual art is well suited 
to help us understand digital works, because these works 
often use simulation and the modelling of systems in 
at least a minimal way. Though Walton doesn’t discuss 
simulations as such, he bases his understanding of 
representational art on the way in which we use and play 
with simple simulations such as dolls.
Walton’s theory is useful in studying interactive works 
because it discusses fictionality rather than genres 
and structures. It is a cross-medial theory and so suits 
the many genres of interactive works well. Works as 
disparate as installation artworks, interactive narratives 
and computer games can all mandate imaginings and 
be used as props in games of make-believe. There are 
also, of course, many examples of non-representational 
works of interactive art and games that don’t generate 
fictional worlds, or that only barely do so: Tetris is 
a classic example of a game with neither story nor 
fictionality, and a net.art project like jodi.org probably 
doesn’t mandate imaginings either. It is always possible 
to use a work as a prop, but it is not always mandated or 
intended. For instance, in Hamlet on the Holodeck [25], 
Janet Murray interprets Tetris as the embodiment of an 
American academic’s hectic life For her each block of 
pixels that falls down her screen is a prop that stands for 
another item in her to-do list, needing instant attention 
(143-4). Presumably most players do not imagine this, 
and not doing so does not constitute a breach of rules or 
expectations in the game. However, the basic assumption 
that one important function of works can be to allow 
make-believe and the generation of fictional worlds lets 
us think productively about the relationship between 
user and work.
The user pretends. For Walton, this pretence or game of 
make-believe is far more fundamental than we usually 
would accept. He argues that even the emotions we feel 
when appreciating fictional works are fictional. Watching 
a horror movie where some disgusting, animate, green 
slime appears to be coming out of the screen, the 
viewer may feel terrified and exhibit all normal signs 
of fear: screaming, cringing, a rapid pulse and so on. In 
everyday conversation we would say that this person 
was frightened of the slime. Walton argues that in fact, 
the person was fictionally frightened. The fear was not 
actual but pretended, part of a game of make-believe. A 
parallel example that may be easier to accept is that of 
a child playing a game with his father where the father 
pretends to be a monster. The father jumps up from 
behind a chair and roars, and the child screams and runs 
away – and comes right back for more. This child is not 
actually afraid, Walton argues, but is fictionally afraid, 
just as the viewer of the horror movie is fictionally afraid 
of the slime monster. Another way of saying this is that 
we pretend to be afraid. It is a performance. 
BINO & COOLʼS MASTERCLASS
Walton builds his theory of fictionality on simulations 
like toys and games, and then uses this framework to 
show how we play with art. Works of digital art that are 
primarily simulations are thus very easy to read through 
the lens of Walton’s theory, however this also means that 
little new knowledge is gained of the works by applying 
the theory. Looking at a digital art installation, Bino & 
Cool’s Masterclass, will however provide a foundation 
for analysing digital art works in which the user’s make-
believe is less explicit.
I experienced Bino & Cool’s Masterclass [7] at an 
exhibition of electronic art at the Nordic Interactive 
Conference 2001. The installation explores control 
and the complementary positions of dominance and 
submission. The system interprets user movements as 
either dominant or submissive, and presents dominant 
users with images of a slave on screen and submissive 
users with images of a dominatrix. When I saw 
Masterclass, the artists who had created it were present. 
Bino was dressed as a dominatrix, in a leather corset, 
net stockings and stiletto heels. She held a whip in one 
hand, casually fingering its tail with the other. Cool 
stood beside her: blond, obedient and silent. They stood 
near an enclosure of about four by ten metres which 
was empty apart from a large screen at one of its short 
ends. A narrow gap in the fencing allowed a single 
member of the audience to enter the enclosure and stand 
or walk in front of the screen. When it was my turn to 
enter, Bino handed me a whip, and told me to try myself 
against the machine. So I stepped into the enclosure 
and looked uncertainly at the screen, where an image 
of Bino loomed over me, cracking her whip and telling 
me to obey her. I hesitantly stepped backwards, and on 
the screen Bino kept ordering me to behave. “You have 
to move more aggressively”, the actual Bino coached 
me, “try to dominate the machine!”. So I tried to move 
quickly and decisively. With fast, determined steps 
crossing the whole floor space, and an occasional crack 
of the whip, I managed to dominate the machine for an 
instant, and was rewarded with images of Cool on the 
screen, kneeling in front of me.
The Masterclass models a system: it replicates certain 
potential behaviours in a relationship between two 
people, or perhaps also between a person and a machine. 
Of course this simulation is very simplistic: one element 
of a possible relationship is modelled and all others 
are ignored. To model a system is to interpret it, to 
emphasise certain aspects above others. Simulation 
is as selective and potentially subjective as any other 
representation. As a simulation, Masterclass can be 
understood as a toy, much like the baby doll that I can 
pretend to feed, burp and sing to sleep.
Just as the rowing simulator, Masterclass is a simulation 
that places the user inside the model. When I enter the 
motion-sensitive area in front of the screen, I become 
part of the system. Cracking the whip in front of the 
screen, I use the artwork as a prop (or as a system of 
props) in a game of make-believe. Fictionally, I am a 
would-be dominatrix, perhaps a dominatrix-in-training, 
attending a master class to learn how to dominate 
the machine. The fictional world is not absolutely 
determined, but my imaginings are definitely guided 
by props: the images on the screen and the whip in my 
hand. In addition my movements position me in relation 
to this representation: it is a representation that includes 
me. In becoming part of the system, I myself become 
more clearly a prop than when I look at a painting. 
(Though I will show, in a page or two, how looking at a 
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painting is also to imagine yourself as within the fiction.) 
Walton would say that it is fictional that I dominate 
– or fail to dominate – the Masterclass. I pretend to 
be aggressive or submissive, I am not actually being 
aggressive or submissive.  This parallels the child who 
is not actually afraid of the parent who jumps up and 
says boo, or the cinema viewer who is fictionally afraid 
of the slime. This pretence is a form of performance, 
whether mostly or completely for ourselves, or also for 
the benefit of onlookers.
ONTOLOGICAL FUSION
One way of understanding my position in relation to the 
fiction is through Thomas Pavel’s theorisation of dual 
structures and ontological fusions [26], where a fictional 
world is overlaid the actual world. If the Masterclass 
generates a fiction of a master class in domination, then 
that fictional world and the actual world of the art gallery 
join in an ontological fusion between worlds. Each 
element of the work is double. Bino and Cool are both 
the artists showing their work and the fictional teachers 
of a master class. When I enter the area in front of the 
screen, I too become the site of a fusion between actual 
and fictional: I am an appreciator of art at an exhibition, 
at the same time as I am fictionally a pupil in a master 
class. These points of ontological fusion occur in the 
elements of the art work that are  props in Walton’s 
sense, and in a work like Masterclass, I become a prop 
when I engage with the work. In wielding the whip I 
accept a role in the fiction. I’ll return to this in a few 
pages, in relation to the mode of representation that 
Walton calls depiction. 
The point of ontological fusion, of articulation between 
worlds, can be in objects or places, but also in a person. 
This is more evident in the sacred than in most fiction, 
and the dual structure between the actual and the sacred 
in many religions has many similarities to the dual 
structure between the actual and fictional. Pavel [26] 
writes:
Sacred beings and objects, miraculous or 
prophetic grottos, holy mountains, places of 
worship, all these provide for the points of 
articulation at which the two worlds meet in what 
can be called a series of ontological fusions. (138)
The Nepalese Living Goddess [1] is an example of 
an actual person who is a point of fusion between the 
profane and the sacred: she is a little girl in actuality, 
but she is simultaneously the Goddess herself in the 
sacred sphere. Though the fictional and the sacred 
are different, they have parallel relationships with the 
actual. For the believers in Nepal it is not fictional that 
the small adorned girl is the Goddess; for them her 
being a Goddess is just as real as her being a little girl. 
The fusion is less absolute in the fictional than in the 
sacred. The actual world has an ontological priority in 
relation to fictional worlds that it does not always have 
in relation to the sacred.
When I crack my whip at the screen in the Masterclass, I 
use the whip and the images I see on the screen as props 
in my game of make-believe, where I imagine myself 
working to be stronger than the master dominatrix. 
Unlike the four year old girl who is chosen to be a 
goddess, I do not enter the secondary world completely. 
She is the goddess to her fellow believers, and 
presumably to herself. I am the trainee dominatrix for 
myself, in my imagination – but I am always aware that 
I am pretending. I know that my actual self remains in 
the actual world. Any onlookers  only see the actual Jill 
cracking a whip and laughing, though they may in turn 
use me as a prop in their own games of make-believe, 
perhaps generating different fictional truths to those I 
generate. The people surrounding the Living Goddess, 
on the other hand, see the girl simultaneously as the 
Goddess and as a four year old child. 
In effect this separation of actual and fictional self is the 
same as the narratologists’ insistence on the difference 
between the historical (actual) reader and the textual 
positions of  implied reader and narratee [10]. However, 
Pavel and Walton give us a different understanding of 
the relationship between these selves. As Pavel [26] 
writes:
We send our fictional egos as scouts into the 
territory, with orders to report back; they are 
moved, not us, they fear Godzilla and cry with 
Juliet, we only lend our bodies and emotions 
for a while to these fictional egos, just as in 
participatory rites the faithful lend their bodies to 
the possessing spirits. (85)
Pavel continues to suggest that our projected fictional 
selves may be more “apt to feel and express emotions 
than are dry, hardened egos”, and relates this to 
Schiller’s hopes for humanity’s improvement through 
art, which Pavel sees as a hope that “after their return 
from travel in the realms of art, fictional egos would 
effectively melt back into the actual egos, sharing with 
them their fictional growth.” (85) The same assumption 
seems to be made by those who would ban video games 
or role-playing games because they are thought to cause 
violence and insanity in the actual world.
When the Nepalese girl menstruates for the first time 
she will abruptly stop being the goddess and become 
just a girl again. Even as complete an identification as 
hers with the goddess can cease, just as I cease to be the 
dominatrix when I step away from the Masterclass and 
leave the exhibition. 
DOING AND IMAGINING ARE BOUND TOGETHER  
When we play games of make-believe, “we lend our 
bodies and our emotions” (85) to the fiction [26]. This 
loan is a bodily, perceptual and often emotional fusion 
with the fictional world, and it can take many different  
forms. Kendall Walton [35] discusses two main modes 
of representation: the description that is common in 
verbal representations like literature, and depiction, 
which is frequent in images though not limited to the 
visual. Walton’s analysis of depiction emphasises 
the way in which we imagine ourselves being part of 
fictions that are represented in this way. I will argue 
that interactivity is frequently depictive. I find Walton’s 
analysis of what happens when we engage with a 
depictive representation is very helpful in understanding 
how we position ourselves when engaging with 
interactive works. 
In depictions, the act of perceiving or accessing the work 
is “part of the imaginings it occasions” (294). This is 
what causes the user to feel part of the story, or to feel 
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present in both the fictional and the actual world.
If I go to an art gallery and look at a painting of a ship 
in stormy seas, I imagine seeing a real ship. I might well 
point at the painting and say to a companion: “Look at 
those waves!” While a fictional worlds logician might 
argue that this is shorthand for my saying something like 
“In the fictional world of the painting there are waves”, 
Walton focuses on the make-believe in the statement: 
at the same time as I am aware that I am looking at 
strokes of paint on canvas, I am pretending to see real 
waves. This is what Walton describes as playing a 
game of make-believe. Now, when I play this game, I 
include my own action in the fiction. I could imagine a 
fictional position for myself: my son is on that ship and 
I’m standing on a cliff, watching the ship tossing on the 
waves so close to home yet so unsafe. Or I could just as 
well leave my own position blank and open. In either 
case, my act of looking is part of the fiction.
Walton explains this using a Hobbema painting as an 
example:
The viewer of Meindert Hobbema’s Water Mill 
with the Great Red Roof plays a game in which 
it is fictional that he sees a red-roofed mill. As 
a participant in this game, he imagines that this 
is so. And this self-imagining is done in a first-
person manner: he imagines seeing a mill, not just 
that he sees one, and he imagines this from the 
inside. Moreover, his actual act of looking at the 
painting is what makes it fictional that he looks at 
a mill. And this act is such that fictionally it itself 
is his looking at a mill; he imagines of his looking 
that its object is a mill. (294)
Two layers of existence coincide, one actual and one 
fictional. In actuality, the viewer is looking at a canvas 
with marks that represent a mill. Fictionally, the viewer 
is looking at a mill. The same act of perception – in 
this case, looking – is both actual and fictional. The 
perception of the work is also the fictional perception of 
the fictional world. Walton writes:
One does not first perceive [the] picture and then, 
in a separate act, imagine that perception to be of a 
mill. The phenomenal character of the perception 
is inseparable from the imagining that takes it 
as an object. (..) The seeing and the imagining 
are inseparably bound together, integrated into a 
single complex phenomenological whole. (295)
My act of looking is the site of an ontological fusion 
between actual and fictional world, as I discussed a few 
pages ago using Pavel [26].
Having developed his theory prior to 1990, Walton 
does not mention interactive works at all. However, he 
defines depiction as covering all “perceptual games of 
make-believe”, and not merely visual games (333-4). 
He discusses depiction in music at some length, writing 
that “representational music is depictive, typically, 
when it represents auditory phenomena” (335). Drums 
in Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture represent the firing 
of cannons, for instance, and hearing the drums, I 
fictionally hear cannons. Listening as well as touch can 
be a perceptual action:
When one listens to Haydn’s String Quartet, opus 
32 (The Bird), it is fictional that one hears the 
chirping of birds. Touching a teddy bear counts 
as fictionally touching a bear. Theater and film 
audiences fictionally hear as well as see. (296)
The imagined presence of the user in the fiction, 
fictionally perceiving the represented events, defines 
Walton’s notion of depiction. 
In interactive works our participation is not limited to 
perception and private or communal games of make-
believe as it is in the representational works Walton 
discusses. In Bino & Cool’s Masterclass, for example, I 
both perceive and act. My perception of the dominatrix 
on the screen is just the same as my perception of the 
ship in a storm on the canvas: my perception is both 
actual and fictional. While perception is sufficient to 
appreciate the painting, to fully engage with Masterclass 
I must perform actions. These actions are more than 
perceptual: I crack a whip, and I walk up and down in 
front of the screen. When I crack the whip, my action 
is both actual and fictional. To rewrite Walton: “The 
doing and the imagining are inseparably bound together, 
integrated into a single complex phenomenological 
whole.”
This way of thinking about interaction becomes more 
immediately useful if we think about specific works, and 
particularly if we think about works in which the user’s 
performance and make-believe is not as obvious as in 
Masterclass.
DEPICTION IN HYPERTEXT
Hypertext fiction in the late eighties and nineties 
was a predominantly verbal art, although images 
and visualisations of the structure of the work were 
important in several hypertext fictions, notably Shelley 
Jackson’s Patchwork Girl [15], John McDaid’s Uncle 
Buddy’s Funhouse [22] and Stuart Moulthrop’s Victory 
Garden [24]. In addition, of course, these works are 
linked, and links are neither a verbal nor visual form 
of representation, but something else altogether. In the 
last five or ten years, electronic literature has to some 
extent merged with visual and concept arts, and these 
non-verbal elements are often quite easily analysed as 
depictions. However, links and words alone can also be 
depictions that bind the reader’s “doing and imagining” 
together inseparably, as I will show in an examination of 
the first few nodes of Michael Joyce’s afternoon, a story 
[16]. I have chosen this work because it appears to have 
little in common with a simulation like Masterclass, 
and yet, as I will show, it uses depiction in a way that is 
similar.
Verbal representations can be depictions, as Walton 
notes, but this is rare, and usually occurs when the work 
as a whole represents a specific object:
Reading Gulliver’s Travels is, fictionally, reading 
a ship’s logbook. The representation of epistles 
by epistolary novels such as Samuel Richardson’s 
Pamela, of an autobiography by Tristam 
Shandy, and of journals, diaries, and notes by 
other literary works approaches depiction. But 
the games in which these works serve are only 
minimally perceptual; reading is about the only 
perceptual action that, fictionally, one performs. 
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If one examines the printed text of Gulliver’s 
Travels, it will not be fictional that one examines 
the handwriting of the logbook or observes the 
formation of the letters beyond recognizing what 
letters they are. (354)
Uncle Buddy’s Funhouse [22] is a depiction in the 
same sense as Gulliver’s Travels is one. Uncle Buddy 
consists of a box containing a computer disk, two 
audio cassettes, proofread sheets of a short story and 
a letter from a lawyer. The letter states that these are 
papers and data left by your Uncle Buddy, whom you 
may not remember, but who has left them to you in his 
will. Reading through the assorted material on the disk 
and listening to the cassettes almost perfectly equates 
the user’s actual perception and investigation of the 
material with a fictional perception of the fictional 
object. Masterclass  is a depiction in this way too, in 
that it models a complete situation. Masterclass is also 
saturated with visual and aural depictions: looking at 
the image of Bino on screen is perfectly equivalent to 
looking at the mill in the Hobbema painting. 
AFTERNOON, A STORY
Joyce’s afternoon is not a depiction as a whole, as are 
Uncle Buddy and Gulliver’s Travels, but it contains 
elements of depiction that depend on the links. Here is 
the first screenful of text you see after the title screen:
I try to recall winter. <As if it were yesterday?> 
she says, but I do not signify one way or another.
By five the sun sets and the afternoon melt freezes 
again across the blacktop into crystal octopi and 
palms of ice—rivers and continents beset by fear, 
and we walk out to the car, the snow moaning 
beneath our boots and the oaks exploding in series 
along the fenceline on the horizon, the shrapnel 
settling like relics, the echoing thundering off 
far ice. This was the essence of wood, these 
fragments say. And this darkness is air.
<Poetry> she says, without emotion, one way or 
another.
Do you want to hear about it?
The first three paragraphs describe the situation, the 
characters and the events and they present the dialogue. 
When I read these paragraphs, my act of reading  is not 
also  a part of the fiction. I am outside of the fiction. 
Reading, I imagine the fictional scene: I imagine the 
woman who speaks, what her voice would be like and 
what she would look like, and I imagine the narrator. I 
imagine the cold winter afternoon, already dark, and I 
imagine hearing the sounds of the ice underneath boots, 
the slam of a car door. I imagine all these things, using 
the words and the narration as a prop in a game of make-
believe where I construct a fictional world based on 
what I read. Perhaps I fictionally hear the sounds of the 
ice exploding in the distance as I read the text. But I do 
not imagine my viewing of the words of the text to be a 
viewing of this scene, nor, if someone reads it to me, do 
I imagine my hearing of the words to be a hearing of the 
snow moaning beneath boots. As Walton writes:
[The reader’s] actual visual activity is only the 
occasion for his imaginings. It prompts and 
prescribes them but is not their object. (294) 
Perhaps the words “snow moaning” can be said to have 
an auditory quality that is similar to the sound they 
refer to, as the word “shrapnel” does sound a little like 
an explosion. If we agree upon that, and we might not, 
but let us say we do, we could perhaps describe these 
words as possessing depictive qualities. I would then 
imagine the sound of the word shrapnel (as I pronounce 
the sentences to myself) to be the sound of the real 
explosion. My act of perception (of hearing) would 
correspond exactly to the represented act of perception. 
The main mode of this descriptive paragraph is not 
depiction in this sense, though. Had the words been 
designed to be played by the computer as a sound file 
rather than read as words on a screen, their depictive 
quality may have been heightened.
The last sentence of this first node is different from the 
previous paragraphs. It is a question, apparently directly 
addressed to the reader, or at least to a narratee: “Do 
you want to hear about it?” It demands an answer. By 
answering the question, the reader accepts the role of 
narratee, and gains a double existence, both actual and 
fictional. A contract is established between reader and 
text, rather like the click-and-accept contracts you “sign” 
when you open a freshly purchases program for the 
first time or use your net bank [32]. At this point in the 
reading of afternoon the user must respond to the text in 
some way, or keep this node on her screen indefinitely.
The reader can respond in several different ways. 
Afternoon is read on a computer, one node appearing 
on the screen at a time. A new node is displayed when 
the reader clicks upon words in the text to follow links, 
presses the return key to follow a default path between 
nodes, or uses the control strip (see Figure 1).
The control strip has four buttons. The back arrow 
allows the reader to return to the previous node that was 
viewed. The open book activates a window displaying 
the titles of all the links that lead out of the node, 
allowing the reader to choose between all the links. The 
Y/N button is for answering Yes or No. There is a printer 
icon for printing out a node. Finally, there is an open 
space for typing into. In the directions that are accessible 
from the cover screen, the author explains: 
Respond to questions using the Yes/No buttons 
below or by typing. Note that you can also 
type some words—and occasional one-word 
questions—in the text entry box to the right of the 
buttons below. 
When presented with the question “Do you want to hear 
about it?” the reader thus has three choices, besides 
sitting and waiting indefinitely or quitting the program 
and abandoning the story. She may answer the question 
directly by clicking Y or N for yes or no or by typing yes 
Figure 1: The control strip in Michael Joyceʼs 
hypertext fiction afternoon, a story. Image 
courtesy of Eastgate Systems.
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or no into the text box, she may press return and follow 
the default path or she may choose a different path by 
clicking on a word in the text or browsing the available 
links.
If the reader types “yes”, or click the Y, a node titled 
“Yes” appears, starting with the following sentence: 
“She had been a client of Wert’s wife for some time. 
Nothing serious, nothing awful, merely general 
unhappiness and the need of a woman so strong to 
have friends.” Type “no” or click N, and the computer 
responds with a node titled “no”: “I understand how you 
feel. Nothing is more empty than heat. Seen so starkly 
the world holds wonder only in the expanses of clover 
where the bees work.” The node continues in similar 
style: descriptive, poetic and dreaming. No events are 
narrated for several nodes. The narrator doesn’t tell the 
story but instead offers general reflections. If the reader 
answers yes or no, then, the work appears to listen to the 
reader’s answer and responds appropriately.
In afternoon linked words are not marked. Most nodes 
have a default link to another node that is activated if 
the reader presses return or clicks a word or phrase that 
is not linked. Following the default link is equivalent to 
ignoring the question posed by the narrator. Most of the 
words and phrases in this first node are not linked, and 
will lead to the same default node as the return key: a 
node with a sole line: “I want to say I may have seen my 
son die this morning.”
As these strings of narration continue, they wind away 
from their depictive power and become pure description 
in Walton’s sense, because there is no correspondence 
between my actions (looking at the screen, reading the 
text, clicking to move to another node) and the actions 
represented. Or perhaps, if we stretch Walton a little, 
there is a correspondence. The narrator is reluctant 
to tell his story and yet clearly needs to speak. The 
single question posed directly to the reader can be 
seen to set up an imagined conversation. Just as when 
a friend wants to tell us something, but needs constant 
assurance that we really want to hear it to be able to 
divulge her secret worry, the narrator of afternoon must 
be continually coaxed into speaking by our repeated 
clicks of the mouse or presses of the return button. This 
is not as immediate and complete a merging of actions 
as those Walton describes as occurring when we engage 
with a depiction, though. Remember, Walton wrote of 
the viewer of Hobbema’s painting that “his actual act 
of looking at the painting is what makes it fictional that 
he looks at a mill” (295). Though I can imagine that my 
act of clicking makes my listening to a friend’s story 
fictional, this imagining is not prescribed by most of 
the work. In fact, many nodes are hard to incorporate 
in such an analysis, as they are told in the present tense 
and ignore the narratee completely, as though they were 
thought at the time of the event rather than told to a 
listener or reader. 
The question in the first node, “Do you want to hear 
about it?” does require me to imagine myself being 
directly addressed by the narrator. In that question, the 
narrator directly addresses me. Perhaps I imagine Peter, 
the narrator of the story (though I do not yet know his 
name as I read this node for the first time), turning 
directly towards me and speaking to me. Fictionally, 
Peter asks me a question. In the actual world, words 
on a screen pose a question. Fictionally, I respond by 
answering yes, or no, or by remaining silent. In the 
actual world, I answer the question by clicking Y or N 
or by simply clicking at random. I imagine my actual 
answer to be a fictional answer. This question and my 
answer are an example of a depiction. In this depiction 
there is also a brief moment of what Pavel calls 
ontological fusion. “Do you want to hear about it?” is 
asked both of the fictional narratee and of me, the actual 
reader, and in my acts of reading and answering the 
question I fuse with the fictional narratee for an instant. 
Walton uses depiction to refer to representations in 
which the actual act of viewing, reading or listening 
is part of the game of make-believe. This has some 
similarity with Kacandes’s involuntary performatives, 
where by reading the words you enact what they say [18, 
32]. A sentence like “You’ve read me this far then? Even 
this far?” [5] is, according to Kacandes, an involuntary 
performative. We could also call it a depiction. Reading 
the sentence, I imagine myself in the position of the 
“you”, and I imagine myself reading and being spoken 
to by the text. Walton’s notion of depiction doesn’t cover 
all the aspects of Kacandes’s involuntary performative, 
but it does describe the way in which I imagine my 
actual reading as being fictional, or as being part of the 
fiction. 
Earlier, I said that afternoon is not depictive as a whole, 
as Gulliver’s Travels or Uncle Buddy’s Funhouse are. 
Though the work as a whole does not depict something 
else, it does have an element of depiction in its broader 
structure. In afternoon, the reader’s confused wandering 
between nodes has often been interpreted as mirroring 
Peter the protagonist’s wandering between thoughts and 
memories [13, 34]. Both Peter and the reader search 
blindly (with no map or guidelines) for an answer to the 
question of what really happened that morning, perhaps 
suspecting the truth, perhaps avoiding something, but 
never being certain. Reading the text, the reader enacts 
a parallel to Peter’s search for truth. The structure of the 
nodes and the links sets up a way of reading that depicts 
Peter’s own journey. 
Examining this question in afternoon indicates that 
depiction in interactive works can be not only visual, 
auditory or conceptual, but can also occur in the links 
and in the act of interaction.
ZORK
Another primarily verbal form of interactive work 
is the text adventure game, or interactive fictions as 
they are also known. These games were popular in the 
late seventies and the eighties, and though no longer 
mainstream, fans of the genre still play the old games 
and create new variants of the form. The bestselling 
Zork trilogy from Infocom is a close descendant of 
the original Adventure [12], and is set in intricately 
booby-trapped dungeons and caves where the player 
must grapple with monsters and puzzles, gaining points 
meticulously until finally finding and securing a glorious 
treasure.
Afternoon poses one single question to the user: “Do 
you want to hear about it?” The player of Zork 1: The 
Great Underground Empire [8], on the other hand, is 
constantly required to give input in the form of simple 
sentences. Playing Zork is a constant dialogue between 
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game and player. The game briefly describes an event, 
situation or object, and then blinks its cursor until the 
player responds.
Here is a transcript of a typical scene in Zork: a fight 
with a troll. The words I typed in are after the > marks, 
and the rest was provided by the program.
A nasty-looking troll, brandishing a bloody axe, 
blocks all passages out of the room.
Your sword has begun to glow very brightly.
>kill troll with sword
Clang! Crash! The troll parries.
The axe sweeps past as you jump aside.
>kill troll with sword
A quick stroke, but the troll is on guard.
The troll hits you with a glancing blow, and you 
are momentarily stunned.
>kill troll with sword
You are still recovering from that last blow, so 
your attack is ineffective.
The axe sweeps past as you jump aside.
Reading the transcript like this, the act of viewing the 
text does not correspond to the fictional act of viewing 
what they represent, which would be required for them 
to be what Walton calls depictive. When you play the 
game, though, the experience is very different. The 
words scroll by on the screen as fast as you can type 
your responses.
In Zork there are two main kinds of actions performed 
by the player (in addition to the interpretation that 
always occurs): the perceptual action of reading 
the words presented by the text, and the typing of 
commands. 
When I type “kill troll with sword”, that act corresponds 
to me fictionally trying to kill the troll with my sword. 
The correspondence is not as direct as the depictions 
Walton discusses, because I actually type but I 
fictionally fight. Walton wrote that the viewer’s “actual 
act of looking at the painting is what makes it fictional 
that he looks at a mill.” (294) In Zork, it is the player’s 
actual act of typing “kill troll with sword” that makes it 
fictional that she attacks a troll. However, it does seem 
that Walton thinks of the actual action as being the 
same as the fictional action: it is the action is the point 
of articulation between worlds. In Zork, the actions are 
different: typing becomes fighting. But the player’s 
action still makes something fictional.
The rowing simulator I described early in this paper is 
much more unequivocally depictive than Zork, though 
the actions performed are not merely perceptual as they 
are in the examples Walton gives. Pulling an oar on 
the simulator is fictionally pulling an oar in a rowing 
boat. In an arcade game, pulling the trigger of a plastic 
gun may make it fictional that I pull the trigger of a 
(fictionally) real gun, fictionally shooting a bad guy 
dead. In these examples the correspondence is a lot more 
obvious than in Zork, but the principle is the same.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have outlined a method for analysing an 
aspect of interaction that can help us understand how 
users can feel that they are part of a work. I have argued 
that interaction can be a form of depiction, causing the 
user to imagine both her perceptual actions and her 
manipulation of the work as being fictional as well as 
actual. This produces an ontological fusion between 
the actual and the fictional. In brief analyses of three 
interactive works, I have aimed to suggest how this 
framework can enable a better understanding of some 
aspects of interactive art and literature.
I looked at Zork and afternoon because they are classics 
of their genres, and because they in their lack of obvious 
visual depiction have allowed me to explore more 
subtle forms of depiction that are essentially to do with 
interaction rather than with perception. In contrast, Bino 
& Cool’s Masterclass  made the performance and the 
make-believe very apparent, and it is easy to see how the 
user imagines herself into the fiction.
To explore the more general viability of this method of 
analysis it will be necessary to apply it to other works. 
Many recent interactive works use depiction heavily, 
and often in the indirect way that Zork uses it, where the 
user’s actual action corresponds to but is not identical 
to the fictional action. For instance, in Leon Cmielewski 
and Josephine Starr’s Dream Kitchen [11] the user 
drags, drops and clicks using a mouse, but each of these 
movements is directly connected to fictional actions, 
such as torturing bugs and burning a pencil at the stake. 
In Rik Lander’s web narrative Magic-Tree.com [20], the 
user’s actions at some points precisely double the actions 
performed by the fictional characters.  In Rob Bevan and 
Tim Wright’s web serial Online Caroline [6] the user is 
staged as Caroline’s friend, and constantly gives advice 
and answers questions by clicking and typing [33]. I 
believe that an understanding of ontological fusion, 
fictionality as make-believe and depiction can help us 
understand how we engage with works such as these.
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